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Marx: Class Struggle as a Form of Kantian 
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Abstract
The present paper deals with Li Zehou’s contributions to the discussions of Marxism in 
the second half of the 20th century. In Li’s philosophy, Marx’s theories were reshaped, 
modified, and upgraded in a theoretical framework that differed from the original. He 
agreed with Marx’s presumption that the making and using of tools was the basic mate-
rial practice, which made human evolution possible. Nevertheless, he saw Marx’s further 
development of this theory as problematic, because he saw it as being one-sided: progress 
from the means of production to the relations of production, and then on to the super-
structure, only concerned the external developments of the relation between the manu-
facture and use of tools. At this point, Li was more interested in their internal influences, 
i.e., in the ways in which the making and use of tools has reshaped the human mind. He 
was highly sceptical of Marxist economic theories and criticized the crucial concepts 
elaborated by Marx in his Capital through the lens of Kantian “transcendental illusions.” 
Proceeding from his combination of Marx and Kant, the present paper will critically an-
alyse some crucial differences between the Marxian idea of the class struggle as a driving 
force of social progress, and Li’s own version of historical materialism.
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Li Zehou in njegovi burni odnosi z Marxom: razredni boj kot oblika Kantovske 
transcendentalne iluzije
Izvleček
Članek obravnava Li Zehoujeve prispevke k diskusiji marksizma v drugi polovici 20. 
stoletja. V svoji filozofiji je Li Marxove teorije preoblikoval, spremenil in nadgradil ter 
jih postavil v teoretsko ogrodje, ki je bilo drugačno od izvirnega. Strinjal se je z Marx-
ovo predpostavko o tem, da je izdelava in uporaba orodja osnovna materialna praksa, 
ki omogoča evolucijo človeštva. Vendar je menil, da je kasnejši razvoj Marxove teorije 
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problematičen, saj je bila ta kasnejša teorija po njegovem mestu enostranska. Marx je 
namreč napredek od proizvodnih sredstev k proizvodnim odnosom in potem k nadgrad-
nji videl zgolj kot produkt zunanjih razvojev, ki so plod izdelave in uporabe orodja. Na tej 
točki je Lija bolj zanimal notranji učinek tega razvoja, tj. način, kako je izdelava in upora-
ba orodja preoblikovala človeško zavest. Zelo skeptičen je bil tudi glede Marxovih ekon-
omskih teorij in je kritiziral osrednje koncepte njegovega Kapitala skozi optiko kantovske 
»transcendentalne iluzije«. Članek izhaja iz tovrstne Lijeve kombinacije Marxa in Kanta 
in kritično analizira nekatere osrednje razlike med Marxovo idejo razrednega boja kot 
gonilne sile družbenega napredka in Lijeve lastne različice zgodovinskega materializma. 
Ključne besede: Li Zehou, Kant, Marx, transcendentalna iluzija, sinizacija marksizma
Introduction
Li Zehou is doubtless among the most influential and well-known, but also the most 
controversial, contemporary Chinese philosophers. Due to his intellectual brilliance 
and charisma, he had a great impact on Chinese youth, most likely because of his 
emphasis on individual autonomy and democracy, and his questioning of formal au-
thority (Li 2002, 1–19), a “disobedience” that also found expression in his theoreti-
cal essays. Therefore, it is not coincidental that the notion of “subjectality” (zhutixing 
主体性) is at the centre of his theory. It is based upon the notion of an active subject 
forming an independent entity as a potential bearer for the realisation of ideals (Li 
2002a, 174). It is therefore not difficult to understand the seeds of this attraction; 
Li Zehou sincerely and genuinely believed in the young people of Chinese, in their 
intellectual, emotional, and creative potential. As one of the central representatives 
of the post-Mao Enlightenment movement, he criticised the remains of traditional 
gerontocracy that suppressed any form of creativity and independent thought. He 
openly condemned the academic authorities who demanded only blind obedience 
from young people, memorisation of prescribed texts and uncritical accumulation 
of factual knowledge, and encouraged them to believe in themselves: “Young people 
should be confident; they should not allow themselves to be swallowed and over-
whelmed by the huge piles of old Chinese papers…” (Li 1985, 4). Just like China it-
self, the young people exploring its culture should also leave the old, outdated things 
behind them and go towards the future (ibid., 5). Li saw the innovative potential 
possessed by the young as something Chinese society still did not value enough. For 
him, the automatic authority of the old was a relic of the remote past:
I always feel this is the heritage of primitive societies. In primitive 
societies, it was clear that people who lived the longest and who had 
gone through the most things also possessed the best “education.” But 
pre-modern and modern societies are not like that; there are many young 
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people among the genuine inventors. Although they are not so experi-
enced and they don’t possess so much knowledge, they can discover a lot 
and generate numerous important inventions. 
我总感觉这好像是原始社会的遗风。在原始社会谁的胡子长，谁
的权威就最大。因为他活得长，经历的事情多，「学问」当然也
最大。但近现代社会并不是这样。真正的创新家经常有青年人。
他们并没有那么多的学问、知识、经验，却偏偏能做出非常重要
的发现或发明。(Li 2016, 154.) 
Li was convinced that China could not rely exclusively on experts with masses 
accumulated data-driven information, but that it also needed thinkers,2 and since 
youth is the best time to develop one’s ability to reason and think independently, 
young people should make the most of it and not waste their time living in fear 
of the authorities. 
Hence, it was not so surprising that immediately after the Tiananmen Square 
incidents in 1989 Li found himself on the list of Chinese intellectuals who were 
marked as “black hands” (hei shou 黑手), and thus reproached for attempting to 
manipulate students to achieve for their own goals. Li Zehou was mentioned by 
name in the official report of the so-called “turmoil” as one of the elite scholars 
causing chaos. As a result of his criticism of the Chinese government’s response to 
the protests, soon after the massacre he was branded a “thought criminal” and for-
bidden to leave Beijing. In 1991, following massive international pressure, he was 
granted permission to leave the country and visit the United States and Germany. 
He was given permanent residency in the former shortly after arriving. 
Li Zehou’s contribution to the Sinisation of Marxist thought can be found in his 
attempts to criticize Marx through Kant, and to complement the latter through 
the former. In this regard, certain elements of classical Confucian thought are 
also of utmost importance, especially regarding its historicist, dynamic referential 
framework (Brusadelli 2017, 119). However, in the present paper, we will pri-
marily focus upon Li’s critique of Marxist economic theories through the lens of 
Kant’s notion of transcendental illusion. 
2 Li has elaborated on the difference between these two categories of knowledge in greater detail. 
In his view the experts were good in storing, systemizing, and ordering the information, while 
the thinkers could also process it in the sense of analyzing and, above all, synthesizing the data––
therefore transforming quantitative information into qualitative knowledge. In a later essay, which 
he also wrote to and for young readers (see Li 1996, 85), he pointed out that in the future experts 
could be replaced by computers and artificial brains, while thinkers would always remain nonpareil.
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Li’s Synthesis of Marx and Kant
We cannot understand Li’s criticism of Marxist thought without being at least 
basically familiar with the broader context of his writings. They can be described 
as the search for a synthesis between Western and traditional Chinese thought, 
driven by the goal of elaborating a system of ideas and values capable of resolving 
the social and political problems that arise in modern life. In most of his works, 
Li thus attempted to reconcile “Western” (especially Kantian and Marxist) theo-
ries with “traditional Chinese” (especially Confucian, but to a certain extent also 
Daoist) ideas, concepts and values, in order to create a theoretical model of mod-
ernisation that would not be confused or equated with “Westernisation.”
It is not coincidental that early Marx and Kant belonged to the central sources of 
inspiration for Li Zehou’s own theory. However, his system cannot be seen as a 
mere blend of these philosophies; it exceeds a plain “synthesis of Kant and Marx” 
by combining their thought with Hegel’s and, above all, with that of Confucius. 
Besides, Li Zehou’s thought comprises several inventive essential features that 
cannot be found in the work of previous philosophers. 
He became familiar with the work of Marx from his studies at Beijing University 
and was fascinated by his concept of historical materialism and the early Marxist 
humanism. But later, as he became acquainted with Kant’s transcendental philo-
sophy, the young Chinese philosopher was very much impressed by his emphasis 
on the idea of human subjectivity and the human subject as an independent, free, 
active and morally autonomous agent.
Kant’s conception of subjectivity, however, was rooted in the existence of the tran-
scendental forms that decisively influenced and reshaped the (human perception 
of ) objective realty. While for Kant, these forms were a priori, i.e., independent of 
any kind of (individual or social and historical) experience, Li, who also presup-
posed the existence of similar forms of subjectivity, placed them into a framework 
of a dynamic historical development. He tried to relocate Kant’s transcendental 
forms into a dynamic and historical context, defined by the principles of a ma-
terialist development of humankind. In this sense, he complemented Kant with 
Marx.
At the same time, Li complemented Marx with Kant. He modified the teleolog-
ical and deterministic Hegelian-Marxist view of social development through the 
element of the (morally aware, yet unpredictable) human subject, her free will and 
his autonomy. 
In this sense, the “meeting point” of Marx and Kant was for him particularly re-
levant (Li 2016, 154).
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Li Zehou agreed with Marx’s presumption that tools represented the basic means 
of production. Nevertheless, he saw Marx’s further development of this theory 
as problematic because he saw it as being one-sided: progress from the means of 
production to the relations of production, and then on to the superstructure, only 
concerned the external developments of the relation between the manufacture 
and use of tools. 
At this point, Li was more interested in their internal influences, i.e., in the 
ways in which the making and use of tools have reshaped the human mind. 
In other words, Li was interested in establishing and investigating the pheno-
menon of the cultural-psychological formations that were shaped in the human 
psyche in this process. For Li, this was a phenomenon tightly linked to the 
central questions of humanness (ren xing 人性), for it could reveal the actual 
difference between human beings and animals (Li and Liu 2011, 77). 
In order to proceed a step further on this path of reasoning, Li also offered 
his own, unique hypothetical definition of this difference outside of the con-
structs of behavioural norms, ethics, upright posture, language, or the con-
struction and use of tools. These are not uniquely and specifically human, 
for they are also displayed by various of animals. Li identifies the crucial 
difference in the fact that, for human beings, tools are a universal necessity 
(ibid.). If humans had only their bodily biological conditions to rely on, they 
could never survive (as human beings). In Li’s view, this is also why humans 
are “supra-biological” beings. 
Marxist Aesthetics and the Secret Readings of Kant
Following this line of thought, Li has also contributed some fresh and innovative 
insights to the development and a dynamic upgrading of Marxist ideas. 
His main goal was to clarify the relation between Kant and Marx (neither of 
whom, in his view, was understood very well in China) and provide for the cre-
ative development of the synthesis of their philosophical contributions. In this re-
gard he tried to supplement Kant through Marx, and vice versa. Hence, as already 
mentioned, the “intersection” of these two theories was of utmost importance (Li 
2016, 154). However, he went even further: following this path Li took elements 
from both philosophies that he valued most. At some point he disagreed with 
both, and from then on developed his own theory and followed his own way. He 
created the great majority of his new, self-termed concepts during the period of 
the Cultural Revolution, in which he systematically connected Kant and Marx, 
positing their philosophies in a mutually complementary relation. 
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As already noted, he became acquainted with Marx during his regular studies of 
philosophy at Beijing University. Soon after graduation, he started to participate 
in academic discussions regarding various interpretations of certain Marxist no-
tions. In this respect, he gained a lot of attention in intellectual circles as early as 
1956 (when he was 26 years old) with the publication of his first mature theoreti-
cal essay, entitled “On the Aesthetic Feeling, Beauty, and Art” (Lun meigan, mei he 
yishu 论美感，美和艺术). Later on, he further developed his own interpretations 
of Marxist ideas, especially in the framework of his aesthetics and epistemology. 
His relationship with Kant, however, began under completely different circumstances. 
From 1970 until 1972, he was sent to a re-education work camp at the “May 7th 
Cadre School” in Henan province. He managed to smuggle into this an English 
volume of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. There he used to read it secretly, under 
the cover of Chairman Mao’s Quotes, pretending to be deeply immersed in this 
universally enforced practice. In some way, his cynical comments on this situ-
ation are quite logical: “In a difficult situation it is good to read a difficult book” 
(Li 2008, 318). 
However, the fact that he took precisely this book along to the re-education 
camp was mainly the result of a highly pragmatic decision: it was relatively 
light, which was ideal since the weight of the luggage he was allowed to take 
with him was very limited. Also, the book was complex and difficult to under-
stand, which meant that, although a small book, he could read it slowly and it 
would keep his mind busy and give him intellectual satisfaction for the longest 
possible time (ibid.).
In this camp, he also began to work on his first major theoretical monograph 
Critique of the Critical Philosophy––A New Approach to Kant (see Li 1990). With 
this work, Li’s own way was paved with a solid theoretical foundation. He often 
admits that, while interpreting Kant, he actually wrote his own philosophy (see 
for instance Li 2016, 153). In this, he aimed to synthesise Kant with Marx, pro-
viding the first with a Marxist historical dimension, but also criticising the latter 
because of his mechanistic nature and lack of consideration of the important role 
of the Kantian human subject. 
His later version of Sinicised Marxism was completed in the 1990s and published 
in Hong Kong as late as 2006 in a book entitled Marxism in China (Makesizhuyi 
zai Zhongguo 馬克思主義在中國, see Li 2006). Among other issues, Li tried in 
this work to incorporate some Kantian elements into the framework of Marxist 
dialectical materialism. On the other hand, he also criticised the later Marxist 
works through the lens of Kant’s notion of “transcendental illusions.”
Jana ROŠKER: Li Zehou and His Rocky Relationship …
AS_2019_1_FINAL.indd   206 31.1.2019   10:48:40
207
Problems of Abstraction and Transcendental Illusions
This aspect of criticism was directed towards Marxist economic theories. In 
creating his philosophical theory, which is widely known under the name an-
thropo-historical ontology, Li Zehou was namely mainly following early Marxist 
theories. He was always highly sceptical of Marxist economic theories and criti-
cized the crucial concepts elaborated in Capital, claiming that Marx had summed 
up the “two-fold character of commodities” in the “two-fold character of labour.” 
Here, the crucial point was that Marx saw “exchange value” as a product of “ab-
stract labour,” since for him the exchange of commodities was an act characterised 
by a total abstraction from use value. 
In chapter 1 of Capital, Marx described this abstraction of human labour in the 
following way: 
Along with the useful qualities of the products themselves, we put out of 
sight both the useful character of the various kinds of labour embodied 
in them, and the concrete forms of that labour; there is nothing left but 
what is common to them all; all are reduced to one and the same sort of 
labour, human labour in the abstract3 (Marx 2015, 28).
According to Li, ideas such as socially necessary labour time, which were derived 
from the concept of abstract human labour, do make sense in rational analysis, but 
since they are completely separated from the actual circumstances of concrete human 
lives they are not empirically operational. In Li’s view, Marx has thus completely se-
parated the concept of labour from its concrete empirical environment; he abstracted 
the “labour-power” from the actual labour and from the concrete historical practice 
of making and using tools. This caused him to slip into an abstract Hegelian ideali-
stic speculation, in which he aimed to prove his concept of surplus value through a 
unified and homogenised, abstract idea of the “expenditure of human labour-power.” 
In this abstract construct, the class struggle and the proletarian revolution became 
necessary, since Marx did not consider any of the complex, historically deter-
mined elements (as for instance the developmental stage of technologies in dif-
ferent societies and cultures). In Li’s view, such elements decisively influence the 
development of societies, which was in Marx’s view determined by the relations 
3 The German original reads: Mit dem nützlichen Charakter der Arbeitsprodukte verschwindet 
der nützliche Charakter der in ihnen dargestellten Arbeiten, es verschwinden also auch die 
verschiedenen konkreten Formen dieser Arbeiten, sie unterscheiden sich nicht länger, sondern 
sind allzusamt reduziert auf gleiche menschliche Arbeit, abstrakt menschliche Arbeit (Marx 
1876, 42).
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between the class of the owners of the means of production and commodity-pos-
sessors on the one hand, and the working class on the other. 
According to Li, this idea of class struggle between capital and the labour led 
Marx to the necessity of eliminating the market-guided production of commod-
ities, which he replaced with a planned economy, in which social distribution 
should be organised according to the maxim: “From each according to his abili-
ties, to each according to his needs.” In Li’s view, such a logic is problematic (Li 
2006, 141). As he pointed out:
At the same time, I believe that this logic has no necessary relation with 
the core part of historical materialism, which I am emphasising, namely 
with the using and making of tools (and the formation of human lan-
guage, which stems from it).
同时我也认为这一逻辑与我强调的唯物史观的核心部分,即使用– 
制造工具的实践 (以及由之而产生人类语言) 并无必然的关系. (ibid.)
Li considers the above-mentioned abstracted concepts of Marx’ economic theory as 
a form of Kantian “transcendental illusions.” Kant defined them as types of illusion, 
which influence principles whose use is not ever meant for experience, 
since in that case we would at least have a touchstone for their correctness, 
but which instead, contrary to all the warnings of criticism, carries us away 
beyond the empirical use of the categories, and holds out to us the sem-
blance of extending the pure understanding4 (Kant 1987, 385 /B 352/).
In Li’s view, such illusions represent conceptions of objects that can only be 
thought of, but not known, because they are shaped through abstract reasoning 
without any empirical foundation (ibid. 148). They are ideal illusions produced by 
transcendental reason. Such transcendental illusions are still actively effective in 
guiding and organising human thought, for they help us to achieve the greatest 
possible unity of reason (ibid., 389 /B359/). In this regard, Li emphasises, they 
positively influence the human ability to act and to change the world. As such, 
they have a profound philosophical significance.
4 The German original reads: “Wir haben es mit dem transzendentalen Scheine allein zu tun, der auf 
Grundsätze einfließt, deren Gebrauch nicht einmal auf Erfahrung angelegt ist, als in welchem 
Falle wir doch wenigstens einen Probierstein ihrer Richtigkeit haben würden, sondern der uns 
selbst, wider alle Warnungen der Kritik, gänzlich über den empirischen Gebrauch der Kategorien 
wegführt und uns mit dem Blendwerke einer Erweiterung des reinen Verstandes hinhält” (Kant 
1998, 405).
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However, because of their transcendental nature, i.e. because they are completely 
separated from the empirical world, they cannot be directly applied in the con-
crete strategies and policies that are used in actual societies: 
The system of equal distribution that has been implemented in the past 
in our people’s communes was such a case: it seemingly aimed to achieve 
justice and equality. However, because it did not consider or take into 
account multifarious other aspects and complex empirical factors, it re-
sulted in stagnation and regression of productive forces. The economic 
wages were overall equal, but the living standard and the quality of life of 
the people were stagnating or even deteriorating. 
列入以前我們人民公社所採取的工分制, 就因為沒有考慮, 計算其
他方面的複雜經驗因素, 貌似公正, 平等, 造成的卻是生產力的停
滞和倒退; 經濟收入大體平等了, 人民生活水準和質量卻停滯或下
降了.(Li 2006, 146)
In Li’s view, this was also the reason why Marx’s economic studies could not be 
developed in the framework of a general economic theory, and why his theory of 
labour value was replaced by various concrete price theories. Although his theory 
of labour value has a great historical, philosophical and ethical significance, it 
completely lacks empirical operability. 
A Critical Evaluation of Li’s Critique
However, in many ways Li’s critique of Marx seems to be too generalised or sim-
ply too harsh. In the following, I will hence show some of these, which are in my 
view based on a very superficial reading of Capital and the Communist Manifesto.
First of all, Li seems to have misunderstood some of the crucial notions pertaining 
to the Marxist idea of humanism. At least in his youth, he interpreted Marx’s idea 
of alienation in a somewhat peculiar manner. Li started to develop interest in the 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts from 1844 in the 1950s, when he wrote 
his famous essay Lun meigan, mei he yishu 論美感，美和藝術 (On the Aesthetic 
Feeling, Beauty and Art). Li wrote this essay at the age of twenty-six, which was 
the age Marx was when he wrote his Manuscripts. Hence, Lis first interpretation 
of the Marxist term alienation can be seen as a dialogue between two very young 
philosophers from Europe and China, and it can thus offer us an interesting in-
sight into the nature of intercultural misunderstandings rooted in Western and 
Chinese thought patterns. 
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According to Marx (2007, 29), the estrangement of the workers from their prod-
ucts means not only that their labour becomes an object, something with an ex-
ternal existence, but that it exists outside them, independently, as something alien 
to them, and that it becomes a power that confronts them on its own. This means 
that the life they have conferred upon the object confronts them as something 
hostile and alien. The workers put their lives into the object and, consequently, 
their life no longer belongs to them but to the object. In developing his theory on 
estranged labour and alienation, Marx (2005, 42) described the phenomenon of 
the estrangement (Entfremdung) of human beings as a species from their human 
essence or their species-being (Gattungswesen). In Marx’s view, this phenomenon 
is a consequence of forced, exploitative labour and of stratified social classes, be-
cause being a part of such institutions estranges people from their human nature.
In his abovementioned essay on the nature of aesthetic feeling, however, Li seems 
to have misunderstood the concept of alienation, for he endowed it with rather 
positive connotations. He wrote: 
Nature as such is not beautiful. Beautiful nature is a product of sociali-
sation, and a product of the objectivisation (i.e. alienation) of the human 
essence. 
自然本身並不是美,美的自然是社會化的桔果,也就是人的本質對
象化(異化)的桔果.(Li 1956, 57)
He also wrote: 
Humankind has created objects, which caused that nature was sociali-
sed. Simultaneously, it also created a subject, which means that people 
achieved the possibility to appreciate the beauty of nature. Hence, ulti-
mately, the beauty of nature is a special form of existence of the beauty 
of social life (or the beauty of reality)—it is the form of existence of 
estrangement. 
人類創造了客體對象,使自然具有了社會性,同時也創造了主體、自
身, 使人自己具有了欣賞自然的宙美能力。所以, 歸根桔蒂, 自然
美就只是社會生活的美 (現實美)的一種特殊的存在形式,是一種“
異化”的存在形式.(ibid., 59)
In this passage, Li obviously equated “alienation” with a certain kind of “objectifi-
cation” in the sense of the uniquely human capacity to establish mutually separated 
concepts of “subject” and “object.” Hence, for him, alienation was also a precondition 
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or even a method of the specific human ability to project subjective feelings or sen-
sations onto external objects, and hence, to consciously separate the objects of the 
external world from the internal world of the human subject. 
Because of space limitations, we cannot go deeper into the reasons for this misun-
derstanding. However, it certainly has much to do with the fact that in mid-20th 
century China the establishment of a clear separation between the subject and 
object of comprehension was still a most urgent and progressive endeavour.
As we have seen, Li claimed that Marxist ideas such as socially necessary labour 
time, were derived from the concept of abstract human labour. He reproached 
Marx with a denial of any of the complex, historically determined elements (as 
for instance the developmental stage of technologies in different societies and cul-
tures). However, this critique seems to be based on a misunderstanding, for in his 
definition of the socially necessary labour time Marx explicitly writes about the 
importance of these factors. In his view, they are historically and culturally defined 
and represent important elements of the category of the socially necessary labour 
time. According to Marx, these elements can vary throughout different societies, 
and they profoundly influence the value of both individual and social labour. He 
writes:
The labour time socially necessary is that required to produce an article 
under the normal conditions of production, and with the average degree 
of skill and intensity prevalent at the time. The introduction of po wer-
looms into England probably reduced by one-half the labour required to 
weave a given quantity of yarn into cloth. The hand-loom weavers, as a 
matter of fact, continued to require the same time as before; but for all 
that, the product of one hour of their labour represented after the change 
only half an hour’s social labour, and consequently fell to one-half its 
former value.5 (Marx 1876, 43)
Li’s critique which concentrates on his alleged separation of socially necessary 
labour time from the actual concrete conditions of the production, is therefore 
simply wrong, for Marx explicitly emphasises that:
5 The German original reads: “Gesellschaftlich notwendige Arbeitszeit ist Arbeitszeit, 
erheischt, um irgendeinen Gebrauchswert mit den vorhandenen gesellschaftlich-normalen 
Produktionsbedingungen und dem gesellschaftlichen Durchschnittsgrad von Geschick und 
Intensität der Arbeit darzustellen. Nach der Einführung des Dampfwebstuhls in England z.B. 
genügte vielleicht halb so viel Arbeit als vorher, um ein gegebenes Quantum Garn in Gewebe zu 
verwandeln. Der englische Handweber brauchte zu dieser Verwandlung in der Tat nach wie vor 
dieselbe Arbeitszeit, aber das Produkt seiner individuellen Arbeitsstunde stellte jetzt nur noch eine 
halbe gesellschaftliche Arbeitsstunde dar und fiel daher auf die Hälfte seines frühern Werts.”
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The value of a commodity would remain constant, if the labour time re-
quired for its production also remained constant. But the latter changes with 
every variation in the productiveness of labour. This productiveness is de-
termined by various circumstances, amongst others, by the average amount 
of skill of the workmen, the state of science, and the degree of its practical 
application, the social organization of production, the extent and capabilities 
of the means of production, and by physical conditions.6 (Marx 1876, 44)
Furthermore, Marx never wrote about replacing the market-guided production of 
commodities with a planned economy, as such a system is a concept developed by the 
theoreticians of Soviet-style state socialism. On the contrary, he even criticised the 
germs of such theories as could be found in the works of several utopian socialists:
It may therefore be imagined that one can impose the stamp of immedi-
ate interchangeability on all commodities at the same time, as one may 
imagine, one could make all Catholics popes. The colouring of this Phil-
istinopia is Proudhon’s socialism, which, as I have shown elsewhere, does 
not even have the merit of originality, but was far better developed by 
Gray, Bray, and others long before him.7 (ibid., 67) 
In this context, Marx also emphasized that no school has ever played more tricks 
with the word science than the utopian socialists. 
On the other hand, it is also quite rewarding in this context to compare Li’s cri-
tique of Marx with the ideas of some other, more widely known representatives of 
the Sinisation of Marxism. If we want to evaluate Li’s view of Marx’s philosophy 
against the background of so-called Chinese Marxism, it becomes very clear that 
his critique is completely incompatible with the views of all three of the most im-
portant Chinese leaders, who have shaped Marxist ideology as a legitimisation of 
the current system, namely Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Xi Jinping.
6 The German original reads: “Die Wertgröße einer Ware bliebe daher konstant, wäre die zu ihrer 
Produktion erheischte Arbeits zeit konstant. Letztere wechselt aber mit jedem Wechsel in der 
Produktivkraft der Arbeit.  Die Produktivkraft der Arbeit ist durch mannigfache Umstände bestimmt, 
unter anderen durch den Durchschnittsgrad des Geschickes der Arbeiter, die Entwicklungsstufe 
der Wissenschaft und ihrer technologischen Anwendbarkeit, die gesellschaftliche Kombination 
des Produktionsprozesses, den Umfang und die Wirkungsfähigkeit der Produktionsmittel, und 
durch Naturverhältnisse.”
7 The German original reads: “Man mag sich daher einbilden, man könne allen Waren zugleich 
den Stempel unmittelbarer Austauschbarkeit aufdrücken, wie man sich einbilden mag, man könne 
alle Katholiken zu Päpsten machen. … Die Ausmalung dieser Philisterutopie bildet Proudhons 
Sozialismus, der, wie ich anderswo gezeigt, nicht einmal das Verdienst der Originalität besitzt, 
vielmehr lange vor ihm von Gray, Bray und andern weit besser entwickelt wurde.”
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Mao’s agenda of Sinicised Marxism represented an attempt to synthesise Marxist 
theory with the specific characteristics of Chinese society, particularly focusing 
upon the concepts of permanent revolution and the crucial role of the peasantry 
that should, in his view, fill the gap existing due to the absence of a large urban 
proletariat, and replacing it in the class struggle between labour and capital (see 
Mao 1937). 
Deng’s “Marxism” was highly pragmatic, and he is often said to have saved the 
Chinese economy after the Cultural Revolution. He typically insisted on practice 
almost to the exclusion of theory, and famously said it did not matter if a cat is 
white or black, so long as it catches mice8 (Deng Xiaoping 324).
Xi Jinping has directed attention to what he calls the Chinese Dream. According 
to President Xi, this includes the “Four Comprehensive Strategies” (“Sige quan-
mian zhanlüe buzhu 四个全面” 战略布局, see Xi Jinping 2015). This theory re-
fers to the conception of a moderately prosperous society, including deepening 
reform, governing according to law, and the strict governance of the party. 
What all these approaches have in common is the ideational heritage of mecha-
nistic, anti-Hegelian Soviet interpretations of Marxism, which provided the fun-
damental basis of autocratic state-socialism. Li’s understanding of Marx is utterly 
different.
On the one hand, Li’s critique of Marxism is focused on his emphasis upon the 
importance of class struggle. Especially in his later years, Li was a sharp critic of 
all violent and sudden social shifts; he utterly rejected the centrality of class strug-
gle and permanent revolution. Instead, he proposed gradual, reasonable changes, 
and social progress based upon an evolution. In this sense, his view could be––at 
a first glimpse––seen as similar to that of Xi Jinping. 
On the other hand, Li Zehou revealed that there is a great gap between Marx’s 
theories and those of the so-called Marxism, which, as a system, is a product of 
later interpretations, beginning with Engels and continuing with Lenin, Stalin 
and the Soviet-type interpretations that belonged to the crucial pillars of Chinese 
Marxism. In this context, Li also highlights that the notion of socialism, which 
stands at the forefront of all three ideologies, is actually absent in Marxist theory, 
for Marx was primary elaborating on the utopia of communism. Here, he exposed 
the fact that socialism was a product of later interpretations, the ones that pro-
vided the fundamental basis of autocratic state-socialism. In this aspect, Li’s in-
terpretation can be seen as a profound critique of all three of the aforementioned 
representatives of Chinese Marxism.
8 黄猫、黑猫，只要捉住老鼠就是好猫。这 是说的打仗。
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Conclusion
Instead of revolution, Li advocated social evolution, customised to free and auto-
nomous personalities and taking into account the integrity of human subjects. He 
even argued that Marxism should not merely be seen as a doctrine of revolution; 
in studying Marx, readers should rather focus upon his “constructive” elements. 
Hence, he emphasises that Marxism is not only a philosophy of revolution, but is 
rather, and even more so, a constructive philosophy, a philosophy for constructing 
material and spiritual civilisations. This is also a core aspect of Li’s critique of 
Marxism through the lens of Kant’s philosophy, and his attempts to synthesise the 
theories of these two German philosophers. 
For Li Zehou, the synthesis of Kant and Marx has much that is closely connected 
with the concepts of human emancipation and human dignity, an issue, which is 
also of great importance and actuality for the present era.
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